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Abstract 
Context: Incident reporting systems (IRSs) are used to gather information on patient safety 
incidents. However, and despite the financial burden they imply, little is known about their 
effectiveness. This paper reviews systematically the effectiveness of IRSs as a method of 
improving patient safety through organizational learning. 
Method: This systematic literature review identified two groups of studies: a) studies comparing 
the effectiveness of IRSs relative to other methods of error reporting and b) studies examining 
the effectiveness of IRSs on settings, structures and outcomes in respect of improvements to 
patient safety. We used thematic analysis to compare the effectiveness of IRSs with other 
methods and to synthesize what was effective, where and why. Then, to assess the evidence 
concerning the ability of IRSs to facilitate organizational learning, we analyzed studies using the 
concepts of single loop and double loop learning. 
Findings: In total, 43 studies were identified. Eight studies compared IRSs with other methods, 
while 35 explored the effectiveness of IRSs on settings, structures and outcomes. We did not find 
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strong evidence that IRSs perform better than other methods. We found some evidence of single 
loop learning, that is, changes to clinical settings or processes as a consequence of learning from 
IRSs, but little evidence either of improvements to outcomes or of changes to latent managerial 
factors involved in error production. In addition, there was insubstantial evidence of IRSs 
enabling double loop learning that is, cultural change or change of mindset.  
Conclusions: The results indicate IRSs could be more effective if there were explicit criteria for 
what counts as an incident; they are owned and led by clinical teams rather than centralized 
hospital departments; and embedded within organizations as part of wider safety programs. 
Key words 
Patient safety, Incident reporting systems, organizational learning, single loop learning, double 
loop learning 
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Introduction   
To improve patient safety experts have argued that major cultural change firmly rooted in 
continual improvement is required.1 Necessary changes include constant evidence-based 
learning; managerial appreciation of the pressures that resource constraints can bring for front-
line employees; avoidance of blame; and eschewing mechanistic performance objectives.1 
Incident reporting systems (IRSs) are designed to be used to obtain information about patient 
safety, with this knowledge translated into individual and organizational learning.2–4 
Organizational learning is described as ‘a process of individual and shared thought and action in 
an organizational context’,5(p470) from which cultural change ensues. This systematic review 
examines evidence concerning the effectiveness of IRSs as one mechanism to promote 
organizational learning to improve patient safety. We define effectiveness in both relative and 
absolute terms. In relative terms, we examine the quantity and type of incidents reported using 
IRSs by comparison with other forms of incident reporting, such as medical chart review. In 
absolute terms, we use Donabedian’s6 framework to explore the impact of IRSs on settings 
(structure), processes and safety outcomes. 
IRSs have been in use in the healthcare field for many years, but it was following the 
publication of ‘To Err is Human’7 that systems were implemented more widely. For example all 
public hospitals in Australia were required to have an Advanced Incident Monitoring System 
(AIMS) in place by January 2005, in the UK the National Reporting and Learning System 
(NRLS) was set up in 20038 and in Ireland the STARSweb IRS was launched in 2004.9 To put 
this in context, the number of patient safety incidents reported to the NRLS in England between 
October 2011 and March 2012 was 612,414. Six percent of incidents resulted in moderate harm 
and 1 percent (n= 5,235) resulted in severe harm or death.10  
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However, there are questions about the effectiveness and cost of IRSs.11 Renshaw et 
al.12(p383) estimated that ‘the cost of the system was equivalent to 1,184 UK National Health 
Service (NHS) employees spending all their time each month completing incident forms’; these 
being time consuming to complete.13 Waring14 argues that the rich detailed information in 
clinicians’ stories is reassigned via IRSs into abstract, quantitative variables of the managerial 
system, reducing the effectiveness of IRSs for learning. Wachter15 argues that incident reports do 
not provide information about the true frequency of organizational errors, are too expensive and 
bureaucratic. 
Other problems associated with IRSs include: the number of incidents reported reflects 
employees’ willingness to report rather than being an indicator of the safety of the system16; 
there is no shared understanding between clinicians (doctors, nurses and other healthcare 
professionals) about what constitutes an adverse event or near miss; lack of clarity about who, 
within the clinical team, is responsible for reporting respective incidents17; and some clinicians 
may be fearful of recriminations.18 Generally, patients do not have independent access to IRSs 
and their experiences of harm may go unrecognized by clinicians.19,20 This raises questions about 
their utility as mechanisms to promote organizational learning to improve patient safety.  
Health expenditure in most countries has been declining since the beginning of the global 
financial crisis in 2008.21 It is therefore important to consider whether investing in IRSs is money 
well spent, for both the public and private health sectors.12,22 This paper reports on a parallel 
review of (a) studies comparing the effectiveness of IRSs relative to other methods of error 
reporting and (b) studies designed to measure the effectiveness of IRSs in absolute terms. For the 
latter, Donabedian’s6 settings, processes and outcomes framework is used to review 
systematically empirical evidence on how effective incident reporting systems are for patient 
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safety. Pursuing and measuring both systems and outcomes improvements may identify success 
factors, thereby contributing to their enhanced sustainability.4 Then, to assess the evidence 
concerning the ability of IRSs as mechanisms to promote organizational learning, these studies 
are analysed using Argyris and Schön’s23 concepts of single loop and double loop learning.   
 We begin by examining the background to, rationale for, and practical application of, 
IRSs. Following this, we discuss perspectives on organizational learning and select a theory 
suitable for the present study. Then we describe our review method before presenting our 
findings, firstly comparing IRSs with other systems and then assessing their effectiveness.   
 
Incident Reporting Systems (IRSs) 
The theory underpinning IRSs is that for organizations to improve their safety performance 
managers should be aware of events in their organization and employees feel confident to report 
errors and near misses without fear of recrimination.3,24 Managers and employees can obtain data 
about the frequency and severity of incidents, benchmark their performance against other similar 
organizations, and identify systems’ deficiencies to improve performance and provide insights 
into human factors in areas such as management, training and fatigue. Experts have argued that 
organizations can learn from these data, using this learning to alter structures and processes to 
reduce both the actual harm and the potential for harm.3,25  
IRSs are credited with helping to improve substantially the safety of airline travel and it 
was therefore assumed that there would be valuable lessons for healthcare.7,26,27 There are two 
aspects to an IRS: firstly, the reporting of ‘adverse events’ or ‘patient safety incidents’ -any 
unintended or unexpected incident(s) that led to harm for one or more persons28(p2); secondly, the 
reporting of ‘near misses’-any event(s) that did not cause harm but had the potential to do so.  
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At the micro level, that is the level of organization where agents interact and rules are 
adopted, maintained, changed or resisted in their local context,29 Reason30 argues that IRSs 
provide a systematic method to enhance ongoing learning from experience for the primary 
purpose of improving patient safety. Voluntary confidential reporting is thought to enhance 
understanding of the frequency of types of adverse events, near misses and their patterns and 
trends, hence acting as a warning system. This information should then be utilized at the micro-
meso level of organization, that is individual actors plus the system of rules.29 At this level 
changes to common rules should occur to enable system redesign to reduce the possibility of 
adverse events (re)occurring. NASA claims that aviation safety reporting assists the 
identification of training needs; provides evidence that interventions have been effective; and 
engenders a more open culture in which incidents or service failures can be reported and 
discussed.24 At the macro organizational level, that is, a higher order of organization which arises 
from the existence of interacting populations of meso rules,29 IRSs are considered to be an 
accurate early warning system for the identification of problems related to emerging technologies 
and global economic trends.16,31  
Several authors contend that adverse events occur when active failures, that is the errors, 
omissions or unsafe acts by individuals, interact with latent conditions (underlying structures and 
processes) within an organization, to cause harm. Near miss events occur up to 300 times more 
often than adverse events.32,33 Evidence suggests that within health care organizations pressure 
on front-line employees to increase efficiency has created a safety culture where deviance is 
normalized34(pi69) as employees attempt to cope with competing demands by fixing or working 
around problems at the local level, their actions hiding latent conditions, which increase 
susceptibility to error, and at the same time instilling them into the system.30 In addition, public 
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inquiries into UK NHS failings have reported that the dominance of doctors in the occupational 
hierarchy, in combination with a culture of fear can prevent other groups from speaking up about 
safety.35,36 Turner maintains that readjustment of such cultural norms will lead to reduction of 
errors.37 Theories emphasize how IRSs are a trigger for culture change, promoting knowledge 
sharing by aggregating data collected at a local level to reveal and disseminate more widely 
those patterns of cause and effect (latent conditions) which increase susceptibility to the same 
types of errors occurring in differing contexts.30,38   
An IRS should be a secure information resource accessible and responsive to users.24 The 
safety literature contends that to promote its widespread acceptance and use: all stakeholders 
should be committed and actively involved in its development; there should be consensus among 
stakeholders over its design; the system should be objective, not under the control of one or more 
stakeholders; and it should be designed to facilitate the collection of narratives about incidents in 
the respective reporter’s own words.31,39 Evidence suggests that critical to the success of any IRS 
is the quality of the feedback given to reporters to enable learning, encourage reporting and 
provide reporters with evidence that the information they are providing is being utilized 
appropriately.40,41  
 
Organizational learning (Theory) 
As noted above, IRSs are regarded as a mechanism to promote organizational learning to 
improve patient safety; and there is particular interest in organizational learning that leads to 
cultural change. We now consider the available theory or theories of organizational learning.  
Since Cyert and March42 coined the term `organizational learning’, scholarship has 
burgeoned, reflected in reviews of the field such as Easterby-Smith et al.43; Easterby-Smith and 
Lyles44 and Shipton.45 While it is broadly acknowledged that an organization’s ability to learn 
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and adapt to changing circumstances is critical to its performance and long-term success,46 
competing theoretical perspectives on organizational learning exist. Rashman et al.5(p471) for 
example, cite Chiva and Alegre’s47 identification of two broad perspectives, `cognitive 
possession’ and `social-process’. 
With regard to the latter, authors such as Rashman et al.5 and Waring & Bishop48 argue 
that social, situated theories of organizational learning are highly relevant to public service and 
healthcare contexts. This type of theory regards organizational learning as complex and 
emergent, occurring through and embedded in social practices.49 Healthcare organizations in 
particular are characterized by professional communities that span organizational boundaries,5 
involving multiple stakeholders in a complex inter-professional setting.  
A social perspective on organizational learning also highlights the political dimension of 
knowledge and the way this can influence and impede it. Hence in healthcare, an IRS may be 
perceived as a managerial control mechanism, existing for the purpose of governance or (self-
)surveillance, or as bound up with organizational and inter-professional politics and agendas. 
Powerful professional interests can be projected onto initiatives such as IRSs, thus seizing them 
as new territory on which existing battles can be fought. In healthcare organizations, knowledge 
forms the basis of professional power and jurisdictional control; what counts as knowledge is 
contested terrain50,51 hence a source of conflict between the various clinical professions and 
between clinicians and managers. Therefore, it may be wrong to assume that clinicians are 
willing to share information about errors widely.14 Doctors, particularly surgeons, are often 
reluctant to report incidents seeing IRSs as a managerial encroachment on their professional 
status and individual autonomy.41,52–55 Research suggests they are more inclined to participate 
when the IRS is situated and managed within the medical department.56 Within the UK NHS, 
9 
 
evidence indicates an underlying hostility and distrust between doctors and managers with 
doctors prioritizing professional learning over organizational learning, their non-cooperation 
undermining the implementation of the NRLS.55 In addition, Waring55 contends that doctors are 
reluctant to report incidents both for fear of litigation and because they consider errors part of the 
inherent uncertainty of medical practice. Therefore, rather than facilitate organizational learning, 
IRSs may decontextualize knowledge and act as a structure for organizational power by 
engendering conflict and competition for control over what counts as an error and hence what 
type of knowledge is legitimate.2,14,57,58 Although accompanied by a rhetoric of learning, IRSs 
may instead be the product of normative and coercive isomorphic pressure,59 a method of 
maintaining and/or restoring an organization’s legitimacy.16 
While recognising the merits of a social perspective on organizational learning for the 
way in which learning from IRS is likely to occur in healthcare settings, our specific need in this 
paper is for a theory of organizational learning that enables us to assess the evidence presented in 
the studies examined. Hence we have chosen the seminal work of Argyris and Schön23,60 on 
single and double loop learning. Argyris and Schön’s theory represents a primarily (if not 
exclusively) cognitive perspective towards organizational learning, according to Chiva and 
Alegre,47 being concerned with the process by which learning leads either to the correction of 
errors within existing goals, policies and values, or to changes in those goals, policies and values.  
The principal reason for choosing Argyris and Schön’s theory, in preference to social 
theories of organizational learning, is that their distinction between single and double loop 
learning enables us to interrogate evidence, provided in the papers we have reviewed to classify 
the type of organizational learning produced by IRSs.  In particular, it enables us to differentiate 
between operational improvements and possible examples of cultural change. This is important 
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given the emphasis in the literature on the role of IRSs in changing patient safety culture. There 
are, nevertheless, potential limitations to using Argyris and Schön’s theory, to which we return in 
the Discussion.    
To describe Argyris and Schön’s theory in more detail, it proposes two principal forms of 
organizational learning. `Single loop learning’ refers to the correction of operational errors, 
without significant change in the overall safety culture and `double loop learning’, the 
questioning and alteration of what Argyis and Schön called `governing variables’. Thus: ‘When 
the error detected and corrected permits the organization to carry on its present policies or 
achieve its present objectives, then that error-and-correction process is single-loop learning. 
Double-loop learning occurs when error is detected and corrected in ways that involve the 
modification of an organization’s underlying norms, policies and objectives.’ 23(pp2-3) To achieve 
cultural change, IRSs would appear to need to produce double, not single loop learning, equating 
to a shift in safety culture and `mindset’ and resulting in a significantly different approach to the 
treatment of errors in healthcare organizations. 
Argyris and Schön’s theory23 also identifies barriers to double loop learning in practice, 
which (they argue) make it more likely that organizations will undertake single loop learning. In 
particular, double loop learning is impeded by defensive behaviour that guards people against 
embarrassment and `exposure to blame’.23(p40) In relation to IRSs, defensive behaviour could lead 
not only to the non-reporting of errors, but also to the non-reporting itself being covered up. 
Hence Edmondson, based on Argyris’ observation that `people tend to act in ways that inhibit 
learning when they face the potential for threat or embarrassment61’, 62(p352) argues that to 
achieve double loop learning in practice requires, a climate of sufficient psychological safety62 to 
mitigate the propensity for defensive behaviour. 
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Argyris and Schön’s theory therefore also enables review of evidence of potential barriers 
to double loop learning (the desired cultural change) in the studies examined. For example, fear 
of blame or reprisals, and the fact that `health care workers of all kinds are exposed to an 
inordinate amount of intimidating behavior’,11(p464) would therefore appear incompatible with the 
requirement for sufficient psychological safety. Similarly, trying to enforce incident reporting 
through coercion (such as the threat of legal action) also seems likely to reinforce defensive 
behaviour.    
In summary, in order to examine the relationship between IRSs and organizational 
learning a theory is necessary. While social theories of organizational learning acknowledge the 
complexity of healthcare contexts, the specific purpose of this paper led us to employ Argyris 
and Schön’s theory of single and double loop learning to interrogate evidence of the type of 
organizational learning indicated by the studies in our review. As we have discussed, there are a 
number of reasons why IRSs may be problematic. Nonetheless, there has been no systematic 
review integrating the studies exploring the effectiveness of IRSs in the healthcare context.12,33 
The aim of this paper is to analyze and synthesize empirical evidence relating to the 
effectiveness of IRSs as a method of improving patient safety via organizational learning.  
 
Method 
Search strategy 
Our search strategy was designed to find empirical studies about the effectiveness of IRSs as a 
method to improve patient safety. The search period was from January 1999, the year “To Err is 
Human”7 was published, to March 2014. As indicated in Figure 1, we searched key healthcare 
journals, organization-based websites related to patient safety and online search engines. The 
search terms applied in all cases were: ‘adverse event* reporting’; ‘clinical incident *reporting’; 
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‘incident reporting* safety’; ‘reporting medical errors’; ‘Reporting and Learning System(s)’; 
‘Advanced Incident Monitoring System’; ‘Patient Safety Reporting System(s)’, ‘National 
Learning and Reporting Systems’; errors and organi?ational learning’; ‘Datix and organi?ational 
learning’; 'clinical incident analysis'; 'root cause analysis'; 'failure mode and effects analysis'; and 
‘safer surgery checklist’.  
We hand searched 11 key healthcare journals including Milbank Quarterly, Social 
Science and Medicine, Quality and Safety in Health Care, International Journal of Health Care 
Quality Assurance, Health, New England Journal of Medicine, Journal of the American Medical 
Association, British Medical Journal, Medical Journal of Australia, the Canadian Medical 
Association Journal and the New Zealand Medical Journal.  
We also included in our search organization-based websites related to patient safety 
including Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, The Joint Commission on Accreditation 
of Healthcare Organizations/ International Centre for Patient Safety, The National Patient Safety 
Agency (UK), The National Patients Safety Foundation (USA), The Health Foundation (UK), 
The Australian Patient Safety Foundation, Canadian Patient Safety Institute, the Scottish Patient 
Safety Programme, Health Quality and Safety Commission New Zealand, NASA and the WHO. 
Finally, we searched systematically for articles in PUBMED, ISI Web of Knowledge and Google 
Scholar.  
Abstracts were obtained based on judgments about the content of each article using the 
title and key words. Two of the authors reviewed the abstracts independently, cross-referencing 
judgements on the papers. For abstracts to be included, they had to provide empirical data either 
on comparisons with other methods of incident reporting or in relation to changes to settings, 
processes or outcomes as a consequence of knowledge gained initially through information 
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derived from an IRS. We excluded systematic literature reviews. Where there was disagreement 
between reviewers, abstracts were included. Having agreed on the abstracts for inclusion, 
duplicates were removed and full papers retrieved. Following this we read, reread, and discussed 
the papers, again excluding those that did not meet the aims of our study. Finally, we hand 
searched the references of each full paper retrieved for titles and key words that included our 
search terms to identify further papers than may have been omitted by the search to date.  
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
Studies were limited to those published in English with no restrictions on the basis of 
country of origin or the context in which studies were undertaken.  We included only empirical 
papers that sought to examine how effective IRSs are for patient safety, either by comparing 
them to other systems or by looking at improvements in structure, settings or outcomes 
according to Donabedian’s6 framework described below. We excluded opinion papers, 
systematic literature reviews and studies that analyzed the effectiveness of IRSs as a method to 
capture the number and type of near-miss and patient harm events. Barriers preventing clinicians 
from reporting incidents were beyond the scope of this paper. 
Many of the studies on the final list were descriptive involving retrospective analysis of 
quality improvement work within single departments or national coordinating organizations. As 
explorations of a service quality intervention, they do not necessarily follow orthodox qualitative 
and quantitative research designs. Therefore, following Pawson et al.’s63 argument that the value 
of such studies is demonstrated in synthesis, we took a pragmatic decision to include papers 
based on their relevance, that is if they addressed our research question using the data extraction 
process (see appendixes A and B), rather than by assessing the quality of the selected articles 
using a standard checklist.    
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Data Extraction 
We identified two groups of studies: a) studies comparing the effectiveness of IRSs relative to 
other methods of error reporting such as medical chart review; b) studies that aimed to measure 
effectiveness in absolute terms. Parallel data analysis was carried out to address these different 
but related aspects of the effectiveness of IRSs as a method of improving safety.64  
Appendix A summarizes studies comparing the effectiveness of IRSs relative to other 
methods of error reporting. Data for these studies were extracted by comparing and contrasting 
the various methods of reporting and their outcomes within and across the respective studies.  
Appendix B summarizes studies that measured effectiveness in absolute terms. In respect 
of this second group of studies, we acknowledge that the measurement of effectiveness can be 
both complex and challenging.65 Thus to ensure transparency data from these studies were 
extracted using Donabedian’s6 settings (structure), processes and outcomes framework. Hence 
we define ‘effectiveness’ in absolute terms as the following outcome types:   
1) Changes made to the setting in which the process of care takes place, which refers to the 
structures that support the delivery of care. 
2) Changes made to the process of care, which is to how care is delivered. 
3) Effects of changes to settings and or process for the outcomes of care, in this case for the 
specific area of patient safety.   
Donabedian6 acknowledged that each approach has its own limitations. Outcomes are often 
difficult to measure and may be influenced by factors other than clinical care. Processes of care 
on the other hand are not as stable as outcome indicators. Furthermore, it is difficult to make 
causal links between settings, processes and outcomes: ‘outcomes, by and large, remain the 
ultimate validators of the effectiveness and quality of medical care.’6(p693)  
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Data Synthesis 
Having extracted the data from both data sets, we used an interpretative and integrative approach 
to evidence synthesis. This involved combining a summary of the data showing which types of 
changes to practice were made, with an interpretation of the data grounded in assumptions about 
how IRSs should work.66 
In the first group of studies each paper was read initially to identify the comparative 
methods employed and their relative advantages/limitations. Then we compared and contrasted 
the studies to identify similarities, patterns and contradictions -a recursive process, which 
involved reading and rereading individual articles and moving back and forth between articles. 
For the second group of studies, having firstly extracted and tabulated (Table B) how adverse 
incidents were conceptualized; the types of changes made to practice; and whether these 
involved settings, processes or outcomes; we searched each article for evidence of improvements 
to patient safety as a result of the changes implemented. Following this, we used thematic 
analysis, considered as a suitable method of organizing and summarizing the findings from both 
qualitative and quantitative research,64,67 to identify systematically across the studies the main 
themes in respect of what was effective (or ineffective), where (context) and why.  
 
Findings  
Descriptive analysis of studies 
In total 43 studies were included in our analysis. The majority were conducted in the US (16), 
followed by the UK (14), Australia (4), Canada (3), France (1), the Netherlands (1), Denmark 
(1), India (1), Switzerland (1) and Japan (1).  
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The context for the studies varied. Most (29) took place at the micro-meso level. Of 
those, 15 were in general hospitals and 9 were in specialized units (three oncology departments, 
one pediatric unit, one obstetric unit, one hospital based transfusion service, one eye hospital, 
one psychiatric division of a teaching hospital and one tertiary cancer center). Of the remaining 
five studies, two were conducted in an intensive care unit (ICU), of which one was general and 
one neonatal-pediatric; two studies involved nursing homes; and the final study took place in a 
medium secure unit. 
The other 14 of the 43 studies were at the macro level. Of these, nine investigated 
incidents reported in large scale reporting programs including the UK’s NRLS and IRSs in NHS 
Scotland, the AIMS and the Food and Drugs Administration (FDA) in the US; one explored the 
US Veterans Health Administration; three referred to hemovigilance reporting programs at the 
macro level, including the Serious Hazard of Transfusion (SHOT); and one examined 
pharmacies.  
 
Multiple Definitions  
The analysis highlights that the studies used a wide variety of terms to describe adverse events. 
These terms included: clinical incidents, adverse reactions, adverse outcomes, adverse events, 
potential adverse events, adverse incidents, adverse drug reactions, errors, medical errors, drug 
errors, events, near-misses, medication errors, reviewable sentinel events. One study68 used 
various terms including: clinical incident, clinical error, critical incident, adverse event or 
adverse incident. Weissman et al.69 analyzed data from four hospitals all of which used different 
terminology for adverse events. 
Of the 43 studies, 26 were considered to have provided clear definitions of what was 
considered as an adverse event Nine failed to provide any definition40,70–77; five used 
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classifications rather than definitions to categorize incidents78–82; and three acknowledged the 
difficulties of definition and raised the need for more conceptual clarity.57,65,83  
Examples of the approaches taken by those studies that did provide definitions include 
Percarpio and Watts84 who, using the Joint Commission’s definitions, distinguished between “an 
adverse outcome that is primarily related to the natural course of the patient’s illness or 
underlying condition” and a “reviewable sentinel event,” which is “a death or major permanent 
loss of function that is associated with the treatment (including ‘recognized complications’) or 
lack of treatment of that condition, or otherwise not clearly and primarily related to the natural 
course of the patient’s illness or underlying condition”.84(p35) Sari et al.85 and Wong et al.68 used 
very broad definitions, which described adverse events as unplanned events with the potential to 
cause harm or undesired outcomes to patients.  Some studies were more precise as to the type of 
outcome an adverse event can cause, the timing at which the adverse event can take place and 
who experiences it. Marang-van de Mheen et al.86 specified that an adverse event can happen 
during or following medical care and can be noted during the treatment or after discharge or 
transfer to another department. The outcomes of an incident almost always included disability or 
death, but also prolonged hospitalization.87–89 Cooke et al.90 defined an adverse event as any 
impairment in quality, efficiency or effectiveness of the patient care system. Only one study 
discussed damage or loss of equipment or property and one study discussed incidents of 
violence, aggression and self-harm.91 All definitions talked about harm to the patient, with only 
three extending their definitions to include a staff member88–90 and one to include a visitor.88 
The definitions of medication errors were more exact, although again these varied 
between studies. Jayaram et al.92 and Zhan et al.22 used similar definitions, Zhan et al.’s being the 
more precise: ”any preventable event that may cause or lead to inappropriate medication use or 
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patient harm while the medication is in the control of a healthcare professional, patient or 
consumer”.22(p37) Boyle et al.93 specified the type of error, including incorrect drug quality, dose 
or patient. 
Adverse events in blood transfusion were generally well defined. In the UK, in addition 
to detailing categories of adverse events reportable to, and monitored by, the SHOT scheme, 
Stainsby et al.94,95 listed non-reportable events, such as reactions to plasma products. This 
scheme is professionally led and affiliated to the Royal College of Pathologists.94 In the US, 
Askeland et al.96 gave a very detailed description of the categories of adverse events that can 
occur during the ‘blood product history’. Similarly, Callum et al.78 described causal codes, to 
classify latent and active failures and patient related factors in a Canadian hospital and, Rebibo et 
al.97 defined ‘hemovigilance’ describing how the national system for surveillance and alert in 
France operated at each organizational level.  
In conclusion, the variability in terminology and definitions suggests that assessing the 
effectiveness of IRSs may be hampered by problems of conceptual clarity and comparability of 
studies. We address these implications further in the Discussion.  In the following sections we 
compare IRSs with other systems before going on to explore the effectiveness of IRSs in 
absolute terms. 
 
Studies comparing IRSs with other systems  
Of the 43 studies, eight compared IRSs with other reporting methods, while 35 examined the 
effectiveness of IRSs themselves.  
To begin with the studies that compared IRSs with other systems (presented in Appendix 
A), four of these eight compared IRSs with retrospective medical chart review.83,85–87 In a study 
by Beckman et al., conducted in an ICU in Australia,87 senior intensive care clinicians 
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encouraged staff to write incident reports, using the established IRS, by discussing incident 
monitoring at ward rounds and similar clinical sessions. The IRS identified a larger number of 
preventable incidents, provided richer contextual information about them and required 
significantly fewer resources than the retrospective medical chart review. There were qualitative 
differences in the type of adverse events highlighted by the two forms of reporting. Equipment 
problems and adverse events related to the retrieval team were only reported by the IRS. The 
authors speculated that staff believed that the patient’s medical record was not the correct place 
for reporting such problems. The IRS identified near misses, the medical chart review did not. 
Unplanned readmissions were deemed to be due to adverse events in only three cases in the 
medical chart review, whereas the IRS detected six. Medical chart review identiﬁed incidents 
such as iatrogenic infections and unrelieved pain, which were not identified by the IRS. 
Additionally, medical chart review found evidence of patient’s breathing problems not found in 
the IRS, possibly because they did not lead to an obvious adverse event such as increased length 
of stay in the ICU. Beckman et al. argued that both the IRS and medical chart review were able 
to identify problems of patient safety in intensive care responsive to actions to improve the 
quality of care, but they did not provide evidence of changes to process or outcomes. 
Sari et al.85 compared an IRS with retrospective medical chart review in an English NHS 
hospital. They found that the medical records had documented cases of unplanned transfers to 
ICU, unplanned return of patients to the operating theatre, inappropriate self-discharge and 
unplanned readmission. Not one of these cases was reported in the IRS, indicating under 
reporting.  
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Similarly, Stanhope et al.83 examined the reliability of IRSs in two obstetric units in 
London, concluding that although IRSs can provide useful information, they may seriously 
underestimate the overall numbers of incidents.  
Marang-van de Mheen et al.86 compared the incident reports of clinically occurring 
adverse events gathered by surgeons and discussed at their weekly specialty meeting, with 
retrospective medical chart review, in a sample of high risk surgical patients in a Dutch hospital. 
They found adverse events were missed by both the IRS and medical chart review again 
suggesting under reporting. Medical chart review identified significantly more adverse events 
overall than routine reporting, supporting the findings of Sari et al.85 However, the IRS identified 
serious adverse events that were missed by medical chart review. Adverse events occurring after 
discharge or ward/hospital transfer were not identified by the IRS. Marang-van de Mheen et al.86 
argued that when incident reporting was under the control of the clinicians and supported by 
discussion at regular peer-led meetings it had distinct advantages in comparison with macro-level 
quality improvement initiatives such as National Confidential Enquiry into Patient Outcome and 
Death reports. The authors maintained that local ownership of the data gave clinicians the 
opportunity to study adverse events within their specialty; responsibility for implementing 
recommendations; and longitudinal data to study trends and monitor the effectiveness of changes 
to practice. The studies by both Beckman et al.87 and Marang-van de Mheen et al.86 similarly 
highlight the importance of ownership of the IRS at the micro level for individual and 
departmental learning.  
Of the other four studies that compared IRSs with other systems,76,93,98,99 Olsen et al.98 
compared three different methods of detecting drug related adverse events in an English NHS 
hospital: the IRS; active surveillance of prescription charts by pharmacists; and medical chart 
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review. Similar to Beckmann et al.,87  Stanhope et al.83 and Marang-van de Mheen et al.86 they 
found that the IRS provided a less acceptable indication of clinical adverse events relative to the 
two other methods, concluding that the IRS was effective only when supplemented with other 
data collection. Flynn et al.99 also compared three methods for detecting medication errors: an 
IRS; medical chart review; and direct observation. Direct observation involved researchers 
observing nurses administering 50 prescriptions during the morning medication administration 
round. Observers, including nurses and pharmacy technicians, were paid to collect the data. The 
study concluded that direct observation was the most efficient and accurate of the three methods. 
However, similar to the other studies cited it gave no indication of the relative resources 
involved. 
The third study, by Wagner et al.,76 tested the effectiveness of a computerized falls IRS 
providing a standardized structure and consistency for which items to include in the report, 
comparing this with a semi-structured open-ended description type of report often used in US 
nursing homes . Findings suggested that there was more complete documentation of the post-fall 
evaluation process in the medical records in nursing homes using the computerized IRS than in 
nursing homes using non-standardized descriptive type of reporting. Similarly, Boyle et al.93 
assessed manual versus computerized IRSs in pharmacies in Canada; pharmacists reported that 
both computerized and manual incident reporting were cost-effective and easy to complete. 
However, pharmacists using computerized reporting systems assessed their utility higher than 
those working with manual systems.  
To summarise, the eight studies that compared IRSs with other reporting methods show 
no firm evidence that an IRS performs better than any other method of reporting.   
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Studies Examining the Effectiveness of IRSs 
We turn now to the remaining 35 (of the total of 43) studies that examined the impact of IRSs 
themselves on settings, processes and outcomes (summarized in Appendix B). The micro-meso 
changes reported in these studies were of three types: a) changes to policies, guidelines and 
documentation , b) provision of staff training, and c) implementation of technology, discussed in 
turn below. Following these, we summarise macro-level impacts that were reported in nine of the 
35 studies. Finally, we present our analysis through the lens of organizational learning theory. . 
 
Changes to Policies, Guidelines and Documentation 
Frey et al100 reported on changes to drug administration in a Swiss neonatal ICU, including the 
introduction of a standardized prescription form, compulsory double-checking for a list of 
speciﬁed drugs and new labelling of infusion syringes. However, no evaluation of the 
effectiveness of the changes for patient safety was reported. Anderson et al.40 reported that many 
policy changes had been introduced in both an acute and in a mental health hospital in London. 
Again no evaluation of the impact on safety was provided. Few frontline clinicians participated 
in this study because they did not have knowledge about incident reporting and were often not 
consulted about the feasibility and potential beneﬁts of recommended solutions. This suggests 
that the IRS in both these hospitals had limited effectiveness at the micro level. 
Wong et al.68 described 15 changes to practice directly resulting from data specific to 
vitreoretinal patient safety incident reports at the Moorfields Eye Hospital, England, concluding 
that these changes had improved patient safety. Grant et al.80 examined patterns of adverse 
events in an Australian hospital using data from an electronic record-keeping system. Two 
problematic areas were identified: sedation for colonoscopy and inhalational anesthesia with 
desflurane. Using this information anesthetists developed specific departmental guidelines for 
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these procedures. Subsequently, adverse events during these two procedures were significantly 
reduced. Ross et al.72 reported a reduction of medication errors from 9.8 to 6 per year when, 
highlighted by the IRS, dispensing checking by two people was initiated. An IRS was 
implemented in a surgical unit at The Johns Hopkins Hospital in the US in 2007 with ‘good 
catch’ awards being made to staff that reported and helped to prevent safety hazards.101 At the 
time of publication in 2012 the authors noted that quality improvements associated with 25 of the 
29 “Good Catch” awards had been sustained. The changes described included the removal of 
high-concentration heparin vials and daily equipment checks. The authors did not measure 
directly the impact of the IRS on safety culture, noting that the project coincided with several 
other quality improvement initiatives, hence they were unable to attribute changes in safety 
culture to any one initiative. 
Wolff et al.88 reported a reduction in the number of falls resulting in fractures following 
implementation of falls risk assessments, after the IRS identified falls as the most common 
adverse events. This was a cross-sectional study therefore sustainability was not measured. 
Hospital acquired hip fractures still result in poor outcomes such as increased mortality and 
doubling of the mean length of patient stay and mean cost of admission102,103 suggesting that 
IRSs have made little impact on patient safety in respect of falls. 
Checklists and time-outs for delivering radiation therapy were implemented in a Chicago 
hospital’s Department of Oncology in response to errors related to wrong site or wrong 
patient.104 Daily pre-treatment timeouts had to be accomplished by at least two therapists in the 
treatment room before delivering treatment to the patient, followed by post treatment planning 
timeouts completed by physicians. The checklists included reviews of treatment parameters 
before each treatment step. The authors reported that the use of these relatively simple measures 
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significantly reduced error rates related to wrong treatment site, wrong patient and wrong dose in 
patients receiving radiation therapy.104 
In a medium secure hospital in Wales, by analyzing data from an IRS, Sullivan and 
Ghroum91 identified the peak periods for adverse events involving violence, aggression and self-
harm.  An improvement plan was implemented, this included flexible patterns of staffing and the 
introduction of therapeutic treatment groups. As a consequence, the authors reported a significant 
reduction in reported adverse events over a two-year period. The context for this study is 
relatively unusual in that staff are often the recipients of violence and such adverse events are 
highly visible, hence employees may be more motivated to learn from them.    
 
Provision of staff training  
In a number of studies data from the IRSs identified the need for staff training. In some cases 
training was introduced to raise awareness of risks and establish a culture of safety,92  in others to 
improve clinicians’ skills. For example training for nurses to improve their ability to administer 
drugs72; safe prescribing teaching sessions for residents100; training to improve clinicians’ 
recognition of mental health issues in young people81; education on preventing incompatible 
blood transfusions78; and training for staff on how to improve communication of adverse events 
to their supervisors and for supervisors on how to give feedback from adverse events to support 
and encourage learning.90 
Callum et al.78 showed that educational sessions on preventing ABO-incompatible 
transfusions were ineffective, the rate of adverse events remaining unchanged. Similarly, Cooke 
et al.90 found no evidence that training improved processes of care or outcomes. Indeed, most 
respondents believed that the incidents they reported were not investigated. The findings by 
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Cooke et al.90 and Anderson et al.40 suggest disconnection between the micro and the meso levels 
of organization.  
The impact of training on improving the actual process of care and ultimately improving 
outcomes was not reported in many of the studies, despite this being one of the quality 
improvement methods used.68,73,79,81,92,94,95,100,105 Indeed, the only study reporting evidence of a 
direct impact from training was that by Ross et al.72 in a UK pediatric hospital, who showed that 
training provided to all nurses administering intravenous (IV) drugs resulted in a reduction of 
errors. However, it should be noted that this occurred when nurses were beginning to take over 
IV drug administration from doctors and the authors noted that ‘nurses are increasingly 
responsible for giving all medications, precisely because they have better error trapping systems 
in place’.72(p495) 
 
Implementation of Technology 
Implementation of technology was the third commonly documented change to practice in the 
studies we reviewed. Askeland et al.96 reported on the introduction of bar code technology 
throughout the blood transfusion process in a US hospital to assist in the prevention of 
transfusion errors. They found that the bar code system was considered three times safer than the 
old manual system. Callum et al.78 described the implementation of an IRS for transfusion 
medicine in a Canadian teaching hospital. Information from the system was forwarded to the 
Canadian Blood Services who established implementation and expiration date labeling as 
priorities. Callum et al.78 argued that this would reduce the errors associated with labeling of the 
expiration date, but no actual evidence was provided. In addition, they implemented a trial 
mandating labeling at the bedside via a system using wristband barcodes, portable handheld data 
terminals and printers to allow easy bedside labeling. The authors reported an improvement in 
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blood group determination and antibody screens in the emergency room as a result. A new 
requisition form was also introduced on which the area to sign was delineated by a thick black 
box and written above the box in big letters ‘please read and sign’. However, they argued that 
this change did not provide sufficient reinforcement suggesting the need to evaluate an electronic 
signature as a ‘forcing function’78(p1209) to eliminate this type of error. 
Ford et al106 reported that in the John Hopkins Department of Radiation Oncology a 
change was implemented such that the medical physicists “hid” the treatment fields which were 
not in use for respective patients, thereby eliminating human error. Following implementation, 
not one out-of-sequence treatment was reported. 
Finally, a significant reduction in reported prescribing errors was found by Jayaram et 
al.92 following the introduction of an electronic system allowing pharmacists immediately to 
page any doctor who entered an incorrect order so that it could be remedied.  
In conclusion, three types of micro-meso level changes ensuing from IRSs were reported 
in these 35 studies. All four instances of the implementation of technology were reported as 
being successful. However, studies did not always evaluate the effectiveness of the changes 
reported for patient safety outcomes; for example only one out of 12 studies that reported 
provision of training did so. Few studies reported the outcomes of IRSs, therefore, evidence of 
the effectiveness of the changes ensuing from IRSs remains partial. 
 
Macro level changes 
Nine of the 35 studies reported on changes to practice at the macro level.  Roughead et al.107 
analyzed the case of the antibiotic flucloxacilin in Australia. Data from the Drug Reaction 
Advisory Committee had raised awareness amongst health professionals of the adverse hepatic 
reaction associated with the use of flucloxacillin, resulting in a significant decrease in its use. 
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Wysowski and Swartz108 analyzed all reports of suspected adverse drug reactions 
submitted to the FDA from 1969 to 2002. During this period, numerous drug reactions were 
identified and added to the product labeling as warnings, precautions, contraindications, and 
adverse reactions. Further, 75 drug products were removed from the market due to safety 
concerns and 11 had special requirements for prescription or restricted distribution programs.  
Similarly two guidelines, one on the management of a suspected transfusion transmitted 
bacterial contamination and one on the process of transfusion in France, were published in 
2003.97 The authors reported that incompatible ABO transfusions were reduced between 2002 
and 2003 and misdiagnosis of adverse blood transfusion events were better identified and 
investigated.  
Zhan et al.22 analyzed voluntary reports of errors related to the use of warfarin in a large 
number of hospitals in the US from 2002 to 2004 and mention a number of changes in patient 
care including increased monitoring and alterations to protocols. They did not state if such 
changes reduced errors. Grissinger et al.74 analyzed errors involving heparin from data 
aggregated from three large IRSs. The three programs used different terms to categorize the 
areas where errors occurred, complicating the aggregation of this information at the macro-level. 
This cross-sectional study identified significant harm caused by heparin but it did not explore 
whether organizations learned from the IRSs and if this resulted in reduced levels of harm. The 
authors found common patterns of events across all three IRSs, arguing that in the case of 
common events such as medication errors, additional learning about the origination and causes of 
errors can be obtained only if incident reports provide rich qualitative data on the event and the 
context in which it occurred, rather than aggregating quantitative data.  
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Spigelman and Swan73 surveyed 12 organizational users of the AIMS. Respondents 
reported numerous settings and process changes including equipment standardization, new 
standards for medication prescribing and administration, and staffing level improvements. The 
authors noted a poor level of reporting by medical staff; that improvements in outcomes, as a 
result of changes implemented were difficult to ascertain; and if the AIMS was to show outcome 
improvements to patient safety the level of resources required were not to be underestimated. 
In the UK, Hutchinson et al109 argued that the NPSA provided hospitals with feedback, 
which enabled them to benchmark their performance against other similar hospitals. However, 
improvements to processes and outcomes at the meso level, arising from aggregation of data at 
the macro level of the NPSA were not reported.  
Conlon et al.70 analyzed the IRS introduced from 2001 in 36 Trinity hospitals and 
affiliates in the US. Numerous changes to practice as a consequence of learning from IRS data 
are described. The authors conceded that it was difficult to attribute improvements solely to the 
IRS as the organization employed various improvement efforts at any given time. However, it 
had achieved a 26 percent decrease in severity-adjusted mortality rates since January 2005 and a 
reduction in liability costs following the implementation of the IRS. Overall, there is some 
evidence of effectiveness for improving patient safety at the macro level. 
 
Organizational Learning (Analysis) 
We then applied Argyris and Schön’s definitions of single and double loop learning to the 
second group of (35) studies to assess the extent to which there is evidence that IRSs prompted 
any of the two types of learning. This was an interpretive process that entailed debate about how 
to apply Argyris and Schön’s theory rigourously and consistently. In essence, we focused on 
whether evidence was of technical and operational improvements (single loop learning), or of 
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changes in governing variables (double loop learning). The detailed results are shown in 
Appendix C. 
First, we observe that the evidence presented by 33 of the 35 studies could be classified 
as single loop learning, such as direct improvements to procedures. Examples include a new bar 
code system leading to correction of errors and improvement in patient safety96; a variety of 
changes including new labelling100,105; and  the implementation of new blood transfusion 
guidelines97. Furthermore, there were reasons why the remaining (2) studies did not contain such 
evidence: one  study analyzed the causes of errors but did not report actions taken74; and the 
other PSA81 was concerned with making recommendations towards improving patient safety. 
Turning to double loop learning, based on our review we consider there to be little 
conclusive or convincing evidence within the studies analysed that shows IRSs leading to 
changes in governing variables. As noted earlier, the absence of such evidence does not 
necessarily mean that IRSs are ineffective in this respect. There are several alternative 
explanations for this lack of evidence. First, with some studies it could be inferred that an 
effective safety culture already exists105,106; if so, double loop learning would effectively be 
redundant. Second, with the exception of Aagard et al.,57 Cooke et al.,90 NHS QI89 and Nicolini 
et al.,77 the studies reviewed made little explicit use of organizational learning theory and lacked 
theoretically-informed conceptualisations of cultural change. In the absence of a theoretical 
framework, such studies may inevitably struggle to capture convincing evidence of cultural shifts 
in patient safety. Third, where studies have confined themselves to investigating outcomes that 
ensue directly and immediately from an IRS, they may have failed to capture the more indirect 
and diffuse learning that social theories of organizational learning suggest could be present.  
Even given these reasons, it is an important finding that the studies reviewed are more 
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successful at producing evidence of single than of double loop learning.  
Ten of the studies contain claims that could correspond to double loop learning. The most 
detailed description of organizational learning that appears compatible with double loop learning 
is that by Conlon et al.,70 who state that `A systemwide council of PEERs Coordinators meets 
regularly to share lessons learned and best practices related to patient safety. This information is 
routinely shared with management. The PEERs system nurtures a blame-free environment where 
reporting is encouraged’,70(p1) and `The PEERs system has become part of the culture within 
Trinity Health… This leads to a common understanding and helps to foster a consistent culture 
within Trinity Health’.70(p12)  
In most other instances, the studies infer that an improved safety culture has been 
achieved; for example, `Conceptual changes included changes in risk perceptions and awareness 
of the importance of good practice’40(p148); `the belief that some changes are contributing to an 
`enhanced “safety culture”’78(p1209); `a focused, hospital-wide effort to improve the system of 
medication preparation, processing, and delivery’80(p217); indicators of a positive safety culture109; 
creating a safety culture through a multi-disciplinary effort involving combination of 
interventions92; `Changing the error reporting form to make it less punitive’72(p492); `Developing 
an awareness of error and a safety culture with less emphasis on the “blame” approach’73(Table 
2,p658); and that `successive SHOT reports have encouraged open reporting of adverse events and 
near-misses in a supportive, learning culture’94(p.281).  
Not one of these studies, however, contains sufficient information about the action taken 
towards organizational learning, or sufficient evidence about the consequences of such action, to 
conclude that double loop learning resulted from an IRS.  
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What studies do indicate, however, are potential facilitators of organizational learning 
and/or potential barriers, in the absence of such facilitators (see Table 1 and Appendix C).40,77   
First, it was noted above that, according to Argyris and Schön’s theory, psychological 
safety is likely to be important for double loop learning. There is regular and repeated reference 
across more than half (18) of the 35 studies to the need to make reporting less punitive, to the 
benefits of anonymous, confidential reporting, and to the absence of a `blame culture’ or fear of 
reprisals. Where studies have used medical definitions of error, this may have contributed to the 
research agenda focusing on the micro level, thereby implicitly blaming individuals.  
Second, the emphasis on learning needs to be genuine, rather than rhetorical or espoused. 
Four studies68,71,77,89 raise awareness of the need for learning to be the function or output of an 
IRS. This is contrasted with IRSs being driven by an `audit culture’ where its agenda may be 
(perceived to be) the reassertion of management control; and with the possibility that an IRS 
exists (or is perceived to) for the purpose of surveillance.  
Third, although rarely adopting a social perspective on organizational learning, many 
studies drew attention to the complex, emergent nature of it. The review did not find one paper 
that examined explicitly the effectiveness of IRSs for identifying latent error promoting 
organizational (managerial) factors such as decisions about resource allocation. Yet, it is the 
accumulation of dysfunctional organisational processes which eventually result in adverse 
events.110 An important point made by a number of studies is that IRSs are most effective when 
part of wider quality improvement programs.70,75,104,107 Being embedded within, or linked to, 
organization-wide interventions may offer one way to overcome the difficulty of achieving 
organizational learning in a complex multi-professional setting. Several studies refer to the need 
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for an IRS to be cross-departmental, multi-professional or inter-organizational.70,71,90,92,94,97,101,105 
Others highlight the way that multiple interventions are more likely to be effective than single 
interventions.72,78,92,107 Thus Callum et al.78 comment on the ineffectiveness of small-group 
educational sessions if used in isolation; and Ross et al.72 highlight the need for an intervention 
to be complemented by other changes. Finally, some studies emphasised the benefits of an IRS 
being locally designed, and/or enabling the participation of staff who are directly concerned with 
patient care in that setting.70,77,90,101  
 
Discussion 
We conducted a parallel review of studies comparing IRSs with other forms of reporting and of 
studies designed to measure the effectiveness of IRSs in absolute terms, with the aim of 
exploring whether IRSs improve patient safety through organizational learning. 
The analysis of the former group of studies showed no strong evidence that IRSs perform 
better than other methods. Indeed, medical chart review may have greater effectiveness in 
identifying clinical incidents than IRSs. What is more, there was very little focus on resource 
utilization with only two studies looking at this issue.87,93 Therefore, there is no clear evidence 
that IRSs are more cost -effective than other systems. 
The analysis of the second group of studies looked for evidence of changes implemented 
as a consequence of information gained by IRSs on settings, processes and outcomes, using 
Donabedian’s6 framework. At the macro level of organization we found evidence that IRSs could 
trigger single loop learning primarily in the context of drug prescribing by action forcing changes 
such as withdrawal of certain medicines from the market. There was also some limited evidence 
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of changes to processes and outcomes at the micro-meso level triggered by dissemination of 
IRSs data on adverse events arising from blood transfusion and use of flucloxacillin.  
At the micro-meso level of organization there were few studies that reported on outcomes 
and those that did acknowledged the difficulty of demonstrating a causal relationship between 
IRSs and safety improvements, as IRSs were often part of a wider program of safety 
improvement.70,101,104,107 Further, our synthesis supports Waring’s14 argument that centralized 
systems, at the micro-meso level, such as those used within UK hospitals, might not yield the 
depth of learning anticipated by policy-makers. Consistent with this, our review indicates that 
meso level changes may have little impact at the micro level. While, at the intra organizational 
micro-meso level, where there is ownership of incidents and clinical commitment to safety 
improvement, changes to settings and processes can be implemented successfully using learning 
from IRSs. The imposition of changes generated at the organizational level violates norms of 
collegiality and self-regulation and creates distrust of managerial motives.14 Our synthesis 
suggests that IRSs are at their most effective when used and owned by clinical teams or 
communities of practice111 within specific departments rather than at the wider organization 
level. Such communities have been shown to be nurtured by opportunities for interaction and 
communication111 and are likely arenas for the development of reciprocal ties, shared 
commitment to group goals, trust and psychological safety required for organizational 
learning.111  
Notably, the absence of standard, agreed universal definitions for adverse events or near 
misses and lack of clear definitions and measurement of outcomes makes it difficult to compare, 
identify and correct errors, or to evaluate the impact of doing so, reliably. Without clear 
definition of what counts as an adverse event, assessing the effectiveness of IRSs is problematic. 
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Our analysis showed that when definitions were clear, such as in studies of blood transfusion and 
macro level drug reporting, IRSs were more likely to improve safety. In contrast, although 
anticoagulation is an area of high risk, IRSs relating to anticoagulant therapy did not have agreed 
definitions of harm hence aggregation of information from various data bases was problematic. 
Another factor impeding organizational learning was the absence of a feedback loop; staff not 
always receiving feedback about incidents reported.13,40 
Our review identified both potential facilitators of and barriers to double loop learning 
and indicates that to achieve it, an IRS needs to satisfy certain conditions. Reported incidents 
should be regarded as errors resulting from wider, potentially complex settings and processes; 
rather than narrowly focused on clinical practice or on `solvable’ errors. To deal with such 
complexity, an IRS needs to work across functional, organizational and professional boundaries; 
be contextually located and participative, rather than imposed and managed hierarchically. IRSs 
should be tailored to local conditions to create a sense of ownership and involvement in efforts 
towards organizational learning. Resulting action is likely to require multiple, complementary 
interventions. Studies indicate that interventions used in isolation (for example training) are 
unlikely to be effective. Employees need to have confidence that `learning’ is the authentic 
purpose and raison d’etre for an IRS; as distinct from the perception that an IRS exists for 
procedural purposes, or as a managerial instrument for the purpose of surveillance. Hence, a 
more effective method might be the development of IRSs at the micro-meso department level, 
provided they retained the main principles.112 This finding concurs with the principle from 
organizational learning theory that the processes through which double loop learning occurs are 
multifaceted, emergent and embedded in social practices.  
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Study Limitations 
Our review has relied mainly on formal research in academic journals; therefore, and although 
we searched a range of relevant organization data bases, we may have missed some evidence of 
effectiveness of IRSs within organizations that has not been subjected to empirical investigation 
and reporting.  
The choice of Argyris and Schön’s theory means that we have adopted a cognitive rather 
than social perspective on organizational learning. We have acknowledged that social theories of 
organizational learning may account for the way organizational learning is likely to emerge 
through complex processes that involve multiple actors and multiple agencies, therefore this is an 
area of potential for future research. Nevertheless, we would maintain that Argyris and Schön’s 
theory is fit for purpose given the aims of our paper. 
 
Conclusions 
Overall, the studies reviewed did show some evidence that IRSs can lead to single loop 
learning, that is, corrections to errors in procedures and improvements in techniques. However, 
we found little evidence that IRSs ultimately improve patient safety outcomes or that single loop 
learning changes were sustained, although this may be a consequence of measurement 
difficulties65,109 and the need for agreed definitions for both adverse events and the types of 
incident that should be reported. An important point made by a number of studies is that at the 
micro-meso level of organization, IRSs are most effective when combined with other 
improvement efforts as part of wider quality improvement programs, supporting an argument 
that ‘reporting systems should complement, not replace practices used by hospitals to review and 
analyze their health safety incidents’.65(p3) Our review found little evidence of IRSs leading to 
double loop learning, that is, cultural change or change of mindset.  
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In sum, one way of improving both the efficiency and effectiveness of IRSs might be by 
embedding them as part of wider safety programs and devolving their control and management 
from centralized hospital departments to clinical teams. Results of our study suggest that 
healthcare organizations should consider carefully the opportunity costs involved in IRSs and 
whether they provide value for money. Further work on the cost-effectiveness of IRSs would 
shed more light on this issue. In addition, further longitudinal research is required to explore: the 
impact of IRSs on patient safety outcomes; and how/if IRSs detect, and organizations learn from, 
the wider latent managerial factors involved in patient safety and harm. Finally, future studies 
designed to investigate the capacity of IRSs should be better theorized in respect of 
organizational learning. 
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Table 1: Summary of potential facilitators of double loop learning 
 
Facilitator  Characteristics Studies 
Psychological safety 
 
Non-punitive; making reporting less punitive; 
anonymous, confidential;  absence of `blame 
culture’; removing fear of reprisals. 
Anderson et al., 2013; Conlon et al., 2013; Cooke et 
al., 2007; Elhence et al., 2010; Frey et al., 2002; 
Jayaram et al., 2011; Kalapurakal et al., 2013; 
Kivlahan et al., 2002; NHS Quality Improvement 
Scotland, 2006; Nicolini et al., 2011; Pierson et al., 
2007; Ross et al., 2000; Savage et al., 2005; 
Spiegelman and Swan, 2005; Stainsby et al., 2006; 
Stainsby et al., 2004; Takeda et al., 2003; 
Weissman et al., 2005; Wong et al., 2013 
Focus on learning 
 
 
Learning as the function/output (vs `audit culture’ 
etc.); actual, genuine focus on learning (vs 
rhetorical/espoused); allows for discrepancies, 
emotion etc.  
NHS Quality Improvement Scotland, 2006; Nicolini 
et al., 2011; Pierson et al., 2007; Wong et al., 2013 
Reflects complexity   
Cross-departmental/ 
organizational/professional 
 
Multi-agency; inter-organizational; multi- or 
cross- disciplinary; cross-functional, breaks down 
silos and barrier between departments. 
Conlon et al., 2013; Cooke et al., 2007; Herzer et 
al., 2012; Jayaram et al., 2011; Kivlahan et al., 
2002; Pierson et al., 2007; Rebibo et al., 2004; 
Stainsby et al., 2006 
Multiple interventions 
 
Holistic/systemic approach; complementary, 
system-wide interventions vs single interventions 
in isolation (e.g. training). 
Callum et al., 2001; Cooke et al., 2007; Ross et al., 
2000; Roughead et al., 1999; Sullivan and Ghroum, 
2013 
 
Local and participative  Built within the context (vs imposed); locally-
designed vs centrally or externally designed. 
Participants are involved in problem-solving; vs 
hierarchical, in the hands of specialists. 
Conlon et al., 2013; Cooke et al., 2007; Herzer et 
al., 2012; NHS Quality Improvement Scotland, 
2006; Nicolini et al., 2011 
 
